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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20040120-CA

v.
JERIME ANDERSON,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction on one count of
conspiracy to commit murder, a second degree felony (R. 180-81).
This court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (e) (West 2004).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court plainly err in submitting the case

to the jury or did defense counsel render ineffective assistance
of counsel for not filing a motion for directed verdict, where
the evidence and its reasonable inferences, viewed in the light
most favorable to the jury's verdict, sufficed to establish that
defendant conspired with Jared Mendoza to kill Timothy Lords?
2.

Was defense counsel ineffective for failing to object to

evidence of defendant's prior drug use and incarceration, and did

the trial court plainly err by admitting it, where most of the
evidence was necessary to explain the circumstances leading to
the death of Timothy Lords and the remaining evidence did not
prejudice the outcome of the case?
To prevail on a claim of plain error, defendant must
demonstrate that the trial court erred, that the error should
have been obvious, and that, absent the error, he had a
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome.
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993).

State v.

In reviewing a claim

of ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court must determine
whether trial counsel's performance was deficient and, if so,
whether the deficient performance prejudiced defendant.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); State v.
Oliver, 820 P.2d 474, 478 (Utah App. 1991).

This claim presents

a question of law, reviewed on the record of the underlying
trial.

See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, 11 16-11,

12 P.3d

92.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-201 (West 2004), governing conspiracy,
provides:
For purposes of this part a person is guilty
of conspiracy when he, intending that conduct
constituting a crime be performed, agrees
with one or more persons to engage in or
cause the performance of the conduct and any
one of them commits an overt act in pursuance
of the conspiracy, except where the offense
is a capital felony, a felony against the
-2-

person, arson, burglary, or robbery, the
overt act is not required for the commission
of conspiracy.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with murder, a first degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (West 2004) and conspiracy
to commit murder, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. §§ 76-4-201 and 76-5-203 (West 2004).

A jury acquitted

him of murder but convicted him of conspiracy to commit murder
(R. 127). The trial court sentenced defendant to one-to-fifteen
years in the Utah State Prison, consecutive to a sentence he was
already serving in Idaho (R. 168-69).

Defendant filed this

timely appeal (R. 170) . The court later amended the judgment to
include restitution of $5025 (R. 180-81).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On September 27, 2002, police found the body of a 19-yearold man on an access road just off the Portage exit of 1-15 near
the Idaho border (R. 185: 88, 96). The investigating officer
observed that the man, Timothy Lords, had "massive trauma to the
back of the head" and two bullet holes in his shirt (Id. at 90).
It also appeared to the officer that Lords had been run over (Id.
at 95). Searching Lords' belongings, the officer found his
identification, as well as several small bindles that appeared to
contain traces of either meth or cocaine (Id.).

-3-

Defendant was eventually brought to trial on charges of both
murder and conspiracy to commit murder (R. 64-65).

Jared

Mendoza, incarcerated for the murder, testified at length about
the events leading up to the September 27th shooting.1

Mendoza

testified that he and Mendoza planned to kill Lords after police
arrested a drug dealer named Jody Carpenter in Pocatello, Idaho
(Id. at 121-23).

Mendoza went to defendant's apartment to tell

him about the arrest, since both of them knew Carpenter (Id.).
Defendant surmised that Timothy Lords had "snitched [Jody] off
. . . and that's why she went down" (Id. at 123).
Mendoza testified that defendant "said that we should take
care of [Lords]," meaning "kill him" (Id.).

At the time, Mendoza

owed Jody Carpenter $2800 for drugs (Id. at 124). After Jody
Carpenter's arrest, defendant took over her drug-dealing
business, including the debt Mendoza owed her (Id. at 129).
Defendant had bragged to Mendoza about kidnaping the brother of a
user who owed him money (Id.).

Mendoza testified, "He said that

people — this is what happens to people that can't pay us, pretty
much" (Id.). Mendoza felt that if he "could be a part of what was
going on," then Jody and her associates, including defendant,
would "forget about the money I owed them" (Id. at 124, 127).

1

At the time of trial, Mendoza had
to first degree felony murder but had not
Both the prosecution and defense explored
Mendoza's testimony as it might relate to
R. 185: 152-56, 165-69.
-4-

entered a guilty plea
yet been sentenced.
at length the timing of
his credibility. See

Accordingly, when defendant asked, Mendoza "told him that I'd
help him do it.

I'd do it for him" (Id. at 123). Defendant

suggested that Mendoza should kill Lords with a weapon defendant
would supply, "at a camp" in McCammon, Idaho, on the way to Ogden
to buy drugs (Id. at 130, 133).2
On the night of September 27th, defendant and Mendoza took a
Blazer from Jody Carpenter's house and drove to a residence,
where defendant had arranged to pick up Timothy Lords (Id. at
103, 130-31).

The threesome then left for Ogden (R. 186: 48-49).

Lords, sitting in the front passenger seat, and Mendoza, sitting
behind him in the back seat, began fooling with guns, shooting
out the window at road signs (R. 185: 133; R. 186: 53). 3 Mendoza
testified that when they reached McCammon, they stopped for gas
but "I pretend like I'm sleeping so that I don't have to do it.
I try to slack it off, Timothy [Lord]'s death[,] I try to slack
it off.

I chicken it out, I guess" (R. 185: 133). The group

continued on to Ogden, where Mendoza returned defendant's gun to

2

According to Mendoza, a woman named Taunya Toler was also
present during this conversation (R. 185: 131). Toler was
brought from an Idaho correctional center to testify at the
preliminary hearing (R. 186: 22). At the time of trial, she was
on probation and subject to a subpoena, but failed to appear (Id.
at 20). Because the court determined she was legally
unavailable, her preliminary hearing testimony was read to the
jury (Id. at 22). Toler testified that Mendoza came to her house
with defendant and said they were going to take Lords to Utah "to
do some things to him" or "to take care of him" (Id. at 23-24).
3

According to defendant, Lords always carried a gun in his
waistband (R. 186: 63).
-5-

him, receiving a "a dirty look" in return (Id. at 134).
Defendant then left Mendoza and Lords at a friend's house and
completed the drug deal at another location (Id. at 133).
Defendant returned with the drugs (Id. at 134).

Mendoza

testified that he and defendant went into the bathroom:
Him and I get high. He tells me what is
going on, Mendoza, are you bitching out on
me. I said I'll do it, I'll do it, don't
worry about it. He said if you don't do it
I'll kill you. That's when he gave me back
the weapon.
Id.

He added, "He just said he would kill me.

to.

I knew it was pretty much over the money I owed" (Id. at

135).

He didn't have

Mendoza suggested they could stop at the Portage exit, an

area with which he was familiar (Id.).
Defendant pulled off the highway at Portage.

Mendoza

I was going to take care of it outside of the
vehicle. I don't know. I chickened out.
[Defendant] and [Lords] get out of the car.
They take a leak. [Defendant] gets back in
the vehicle and gives me a dirty look. . . .
[Lords] come up to my door. He come up to my
door and asked if I wanted to sit up front.
I told him no. He got back in the vehicle.
[Defendant] gave me another look. We started
pulling out and I get scared. And it took
everything I had to fire that first shot.
Id. at 135-36.

Mendoza fired the first shot through the back of

the front passenger seat (Id. at 137). He testified:
There's a time gap. I'm not sure how much
time. It seemed like forever, but I can't
tell you how long it was. [Lords] said, ow,
-6-

ow, I've been shot. [Defendant] looks over to
see and [Lords] is pulling something out. I
go to see what he's looking at and I see
[Lords] pulling his gun out. That's when I
shot again, the second shot.
Id. at 137.
At this juncture, Mendoza's attention was drawn to
defendant, who jumped out of the vehicle.
back, he saw Lords' gun (Id.).

When Mendoza looked

Mendoza said, "And I ducked down

because I thought he was going to shoot me.

I ducked down and

shot him in the back of the head" (Id.).
Mendoza got out of the vehicle, opened the front door,
secured Lords' gun, and pulled Lords out of the vehicle (Id. at
138).

He ran around to the driver's side, got in, and drove off

in search of defendant.

He stated that as he pulled away, "at

first I thought I'd hit a post.

The vehicle went up — I never

had hit a curb or anything before.

I don't know" (Id. at 139).

Mendoza drove towards the entrance to the highway but was
reluctant to go without defendant.

Mendoza exited the car once

more and yelled for defendant, who came running down a hill and
got into the car (Id.).

Mendoza asked defendant if they should

"take some back roads" home (Id. at 140). Defendant told him no,
to stay on the highway and to drive the speed limit (Id.).
two then drove to defendant's apartment in Pocatello (Id. at
140) .
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The

In a later conversation, defendant told Mendoza, 'n[W]e need
to get rid of these [guns]'" (Id. at 141). Mendoza testified
that he eventually disposed of one gun in a pond and the other in
the mountains (Id^ at 142-43).4
According to Mendoza, he and defendant also discussed what
they should do with Jody Carpenter's Blazer, which they had taken
for the trip to Ogden by using a hide-a-key whose location
Mendoza knew (Id. at 104, 144-45).

Mendoza testified:

[Defendant] told me that Jody had called the
Blazer in as stolen and that I better hurry
up and do something with it. He reminded me
of the money I owed him. I kind of got mad
at him at the time because I was doing all
this stuff for him and he still — I still
wasn't being — he was treating me the same
way. I got mad and torched the Blazer.
Id. at 145.5
Mendoza admitted that he and defendant also discussed what
they would say if they got caught (Id. at 148). Mendoza would
take the blame for the killing, and defendant would maintain that
the first shot was accidental (Id.).

When Mendoza was, in fact,

caught, he told the police a variety of stories, ranging from
wholesale denial to maintaining the killing was accidental to
conceding it was intentional, and from blaming defendant to

4

The police never found either gun (R. 186: 17, 33-34).

5

Mendoza put several gallons of gasoline in the vehicle,
lit something with a cigarette lighter, and then dropped the
burning object in the vehicle (R. 185: 146) .
-8-

confessing that he shot Lords himself (Id. at 149-51/ 153-54).
In conclusion, Mendoza conceded he was not happy testifying
"[because] the reason we killed [Lords] is because he was a
snitch and now I'm doing the same thing" (Id. at 166).
Defendant, like Mendoza, also told the police a variety of
conflicting stories about the events of September 27th (Id. at
105-07, 113-14).

His testimony came in both through the police

detective who interviewed him after his arrest and then, during
the defense case, through a stipulated excerpted videotape of the
interview.

,See R. 185: 102-119; R. 186: 37, 39-104.

In the videotape, defendant corroborated that "Jared Mendoza
killed Tim [Lords]" (R. 186: 51). Defendant also corroborated
that he took Jody Carpenter's Blazer to buy drugs in Ogden; that
he made the trip with Mendoza and Lords; that he was driving,
Lords was in the front passenger seat, and Mendoza was behind
Lords in the back seat; that there were two guns in the car; that
both Mendoza and Lords were shooting the guns out the window;
that they stopped at Portage either to relieve themselves or to
switch seats; that he had just begun driving again when he heard
first a shot and then Lords exclaim that he had been shot; that
he jumped out of the car without putting it in park, and that he
temporarily ran away (Id. at 46-47, 51, 53-54, 56-57, 62, 66,
94) .
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Defendant's story, however, differed markedly from Mendoza's
trial testimony about the shooting itself.

In essencer

defendant

maintained that he was afraid of Mendoza, not vice versa, and
that he had no idea Mendoza was going to shoot Lords.

Of the

shooting, he stated:
So we're going, we turn around and get back
on the gravel road and I just hear a gunshot,
bam. And I look over and . . .[Lords is]
just going, I've been shot, I've been shot,
like this. And I was like — I thought
[Lords] pulled out his gun because I thought
his gun went off in him, see what I'm saying?
Because he had that nine in his pants.
You know, I just thought he shot himself.
And then I look again and [Mendoza] goes bam
and shoots again. And I just jumped out of
the car, the truck, and start running and
hauling ass.
Id. at 56-57.

Defendant told the detective he ran away because

he was afraid Mendoza was going to shoot him, too, and that he
got back into the Blazer only because Mendoza had a gun and told
him to, thereby leaving him with no other choice.

Id. at 57, 62,

68.
Defendant maintained that he tried to calm Mendoza down on
the way back to Pocatello and then get away from him as soon as
possible:
Heading towards home, [Mendoza]'s freaking
out . . . [H]e said, how could you do that to
me — for running — I thought you had my back,
homes. . . I was like, man, what do you mean
I had your back?

-10-

And then after finally he - everything was
calm and . . . [he] says, you know, tell you
the truth, homes, the first shot was an
accident. I had — and he was pulling out his
gun or something and he said I had to do it.
I said you didn't have to do, he wasn't
pulling out his gun, he thought he shot
himself. I tried to explain to him, I said,
you didn't have to do it. And then I just
cried all the way home, the rest of the way
home.
As soon as we got in town he tried going
somewhere else other than my house, you know
what I'm saying? . . . And I said, what are
you doing? I don't know, homes. He just
kept trying to get me to be with him, you
know, be with him to help him with the
with the cleaning it up or whatever. I told
him, no, man, take me home. He says, what
should I do? I said, I don't know, man. Take
me home.
Id. at 71-73.

According to defendant, Mendoza dropped him off at

home, but then just parked in the driveway.
outside.

Defendant went back

He told the detective:
And I go back out there and I said, what are
you doing here, dude? I said, get out of
here, go, I'm done. You know, I promised I
wouldn't say nothing, you know, I told him I
wouldn't say nothing to nobody ever. I knew
I would, though, you know, I had to. Crazy.

Id. at 73.
After the jury heard this testimony and the testimony of
several other police officers, it acquitted defendant of murder
and convicted him of conspiracy to commit murder.

-11-

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
First, the evidence was sufficient to support a conspiracy
conviction, thus defeating defendant's claim that the trial court
plainly erred by not dismissing the case and that defense counsel
was ineffective for failing to move for a directed verdict.
Defendant's argument ignores the jury's role in determining the
credibility of the witnesses, and incorrectly presumes that the
jury had to believe the evidence most favorable to him rather
than that presented by the State.

When the evidence is viewed in

a light most favorable to the jury's verdict, it was sufficient
to support the conviction.
Second, defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to
object to evidence of defendant's prior involvement with drugs
and his previous incarceration, and the trial court did not
plainly err by admitting such evidence.

Several of the

references revealed defendant's motive to have Lords killed and
his plan to do so by explaining why Jared Mendoza was afraid of
defendant and, consequently, why he would serve as the
triggerman.

Moreover, defendant has wholly failed to demonstrate

anything more than a speculative possibility of a more favorable
outcome in the absence of the remaining testimony to which he
objects.

Given the chilling circumstances of the murder,

defendant's previous incarceration or his use of drugs around the

-12-

time of the murder is unlikely to have come as any surprise to
the jury, much less affected the outcome of their deliberations.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT PLAINLY ERR
IN SUBMITTING THE CASE TO THE JURY
AND DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS NOT
INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO MOVE FOR
A DIRECTED VERDICT WHERE THE
EVIDENCE SUFFICED TO PROVE THAT
DEFENDANT CONSPIRED WITH JARED
MENDOZA TO KILL TIMOTHY LORDS
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred by
submitting the case to the jury because the evidence was
insufficient to prove that he either killed Timothy Lords or
conspired with Jared Mendoza to kill Lords.
21-22.

See Br. of Aplt. at

Because defendant did not preserve the issue at trial by

filing an appropriate motion, he relies on a plain error argument
on appeal.

See State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 116, 10 P.3d 346

(generally, in order to preserve issue for appeal, defendant must
raise sufficiency claim by proper motion).

NN

[T]o establish plain

error, a defendant must demonstrate first that the evidence was
insufficient to support a conviction of the crime charged and
second that the insufficiency was so obvious and fundamental that
the trial court erred in submitting the case to the jury."
at 517.

Id.

Only after the defendant convincingly makes an initial

showing of insufficiency will the appellate court "determine
whether the evidentiary defect was so obvious and fundamental
-13-

that it was plain error to submit the case to the jury."

Id. at

118.
At the outset, defendant's argument is inadequately briefed.
While defendant cites and discusses several cases reversed for
insufficient evidence, he wholly fails to apply their teachings
to the facts of this case.

See Br. of Aplt. at 19-21.

Moreover,

his discussion of this case consists of less than a page and
incorporates no legal analysis at all.

Id. at 21-22.

"[R]ule

24(a)(9) requires not just bald citation to authority but
development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that
authority."

State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998).

Absent any meaningful analysis, this Court should decline to
reach the merits of defendant's claim.

See, e.g., State v.

Thomas, 1999 UT 2, 1 13, 974 P.2d 269; State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT
1, 5 31, 973 P.2d 404; State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247, 250 (Utah
App. 1992).
Moreover, even on the merits, defendant's claim fails
because he does not recognize the role of credibility in the
jury's assessment of the evidence.
NX

The law is well-settled that

[d] eterminations of witness credibility are left to the jury.

The jury is free to believe or disbelieve all or part of any
witness's testimony."

State v. Haves, 860 P.2d 968, 972 (Utah

App. 1993)(citing State v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 901, 904-05 (Utah App.
1990).

And,

-14-

[w]hen the evidence presented is conflicting
or disputed, the jury serves as the exclusive
judge of both the credibility of witnesses
and the weight to be given particular
evidence. Ordinarily, a reviewing court may
not reassess credibility or reweigh the
evidence, but must resolve conflicts in the
evidence in favor of the jury verdict.
State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993)(citations
omitted).
This case turned largely on credibility.

At its crux, the

jury had to choose between defendant's story, which came in
through the stipulated excerpted videotape of his interview with
the police, and the trial testimony of Jared Mendoza.6

Once the

jury chose to believe Mendoza, the evidence clearly sufficed to
convict defendant of conspiracy to kill Timothy Lords.

Mendoza's

testimony provided a basis for the jury to reasonably believe
that defendant, while not actually pulling the trigger, intended
that Lords be killed and agreed with Mendoza to facilitate the
killing by planning the circumstances under which it would occur,
by supplying the gun, by stopping in Portage, and by encouraging
Mendoza to shoot Lords.

No more was necessary to send the case

to the jury.

6

Defendant argues that Mendoza's testimony was
"unsupported" and, therefore, should not be believed. See Br. of
Aplt. at 22. Defendant's testimony, of course, was similarly
"unsupported." Because the only two witnesses to the killing
described the event differently, the jury plainly had to choose
between them.
-15-

Defendant also argues that his counsel was ineffective for
failing to move for a directed verdict.
17.7

See Br. of Aplt. at 12-

Because a motion for a directed verdict would have been

futile, defense counsel did not render ineffective assistance by
failing to file the motion.

See State v. Wallace, 2002 UT App

295, 1 22, 55 P.3d 1147 (stating that "^failure of counsel to
make motions or objections which would be futile if raised does
not constitute ineffective assistance'" (citation omitted)).
Defendant's claims of ineffective assistance and plain error thus
both fail.
POINT TWO
DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE
FOR FAILING TO OBJECT TO EVIDENCE
OF DEFENDANT'S PRIOR DRUG USE AND
INCARCERATION, AND THE TRIAL COURT
DID NOT PLAINLY ERR BY ADMITTING
SUCH EVIDENCE, WHERE THAT EVIDENCE
WAS NECESSARY TO EXPLAIN THE
CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING TO THE DEATH
OF TIMOTHY LORDS; IN ANY EVENT, THE
EVIDENCE DID NOT UNFAIRLY PREJUDICE
THE OUTCOME OF THE CASE

7

This argument is even more inadequately briefed than his
plain error argument. Defendant devotes more than five pages to
a sequential listing of ineffective assistance cases but wholly
fails to analyze what the cases stand for or how their principles
apply to his case. See, e.g.. State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d at 305.
He devotes only a single, four-sentence paragraph to the facts of
his case.
See id. at 17. Under such circumstances, the Court
should not address his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
for failure to move for a directed verdict. See State v. Garner,
2002 UT App 234, 1 12.
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Defendant argues both that his counsel was ineffective and
that the court committed plain error when the jury was permitted
to hear evidence of his prior drug usage and incarceration.
Br. of Aplt. at 22-29.

See

He seems to assert that the evidence was

inadmissible under Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b) and that, in the
absence of an objection by defense counsel, the court should have
sua sponte engaged in an analysis under rules 404(b) and 403, and
then excluded the evidence.

See id. at 25-28.

He also contends

that admission of the evidence was prejudicial because it
"maligned the defendant's character in the eyes of the jury and
eroded the presumption of innocence."

Id. at 12.

Specifically, defendant objects to several drug references:
to testimony about a drug-related kidnaping for which defendant
apparently took credit; to a reference that defendant took over
Jody Carpenter's drug business after her arrest; and to testimony
that defendant had drugs and cash on his person when he was
arrested (R. 185: 125-26, 129; R. 186: 11). See Br. of Aplt. at
22-23.
Defense counsel did not perform deficiently by failing to
object to this testimony, and the trial court did not plainly err
by admitting it because the evidence helped explain the motive
and plan behind the killing.

By so doing, the evidence completed

the story for the jury of the conspiracy to kill Timothy Lords.
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Defendant's claim is governed by rule 404(b), which includes
analysis under rules 402 and 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
That is, M in deciding whether evidence of other crimes is
admissible under rule 404(b), the trial court must determine (1)
whether such evidence is being offered for a proper, noncharacter
purpose under 404(b), (2) whether such evidence meets the
requirements of rule 402, and (3) whether this evidence meets the
requirements of rule 403."

State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, 5120,

993 P.2d 837.
Rule 404(b), governing evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or
acts to prove the character of a person, is an "inclusionary"
rule.

State v. O'Neil, 848 P.2d 694, 700 (Utah App. 1993); State

v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 561, 568 (Utah App. 1991).

That is, evidence

demonstrating a non-character purpose "is not precluded so long
as the evidence is offered for a legitimate purpose other than to
show the defendant's propensity to commit the crime charged."
State v. Allen, 2005 UT 11, 1 17, 108 P.3d 730; accord State v.
Jamison, 767 P.2d 134, 137 (Utah App. 1989) T[r]ule 404(b) does
not exclude evidence unless it fits an exception; rather, it
allows admission of relevant evidence ^other than to show merely
the general disposition of the defendant'"(quotation omitted)).
Here, the evidence showed both defendant's motive and plan,
thus completing the story of the conspiracy for the jury.

The

references to defendant taking over Jody Carpenter's drug-dealing
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business and the drug-related kidnaping for which defendant took
credit explained to the jury why Mendoza, who was originally in
debt to Carpenter, feared defendant.

That is, Mendoza owed Jody

Carpenter money, and that debt transferred to defendant when
defendant took over Carpenter's business.

Defendant's

involvement in the kidnaping of a family member of someone else
who owed him money instilled in Mendoza a fear that the same
thing could happen to him if he failed to repay his debt to
defendant.

The evidence thus explained why Mendoza was willing

to do defendant's bidding and take the lead in killing Lords.
The testimony of the police officer that defendant had drugs and
a large amount of cash on his person at the time of his arrest
corroborated Mendoza's testimony that defendant had taken over
Carpenter's business and that Mendoza's fear of defendant was
well-founded.
Because evidence of defendant's involvement with the drug
trade was used for the non-character purposes of explaining
defendant's motive to kill Lords and explaining the plan he and
Mendoza developed to carry out the conspiracy, it passed the rule
404(b) threshold.

See United States v. Kimball, 73 F.3d 269, 272

(10th Cir. 1995) (evidence is admissible when it provides context
for the crime, is necessary to a full presentation of the case,
or is appropriate in order to complete the story of the crime by
proving its immediate context or res gestae (quoting United
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States v. Masters, 622 F.2d 83, 86 (4th Cir. 1980)); State v.
Morgan, 813 P.2d 1207, 1210 n.4 (Utah App. 1991) (holding that
although rule 404 contains no express exception for "background
information" showing how the charges came forward, "the
prosecutor is entitled to paint a factual picture of the context
in which the events in question transpired;"

State v. Pierce,

722 P.2d 780, 782 (Utah 1986) (holding that evidence showing "the
general circumstances surrounding" the crime should not be
excluded as "prior crimes" evidence).

Although defendant in the

instant case did not make a rule 404(b) objection, these cases
implicitly corroborate that such an objection would have been
futile and that the evidence would nonetheless have been
admitted.
Moreover, the evidence was plainly relevant to the jury's
determination of defendant's culpability under rule 402,
precisely because it explained both motive to kill and the plan
underlying the conspiracy.

The final analytical hurdle is

whether the probative value of the evidence "is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence."

Utah R. Evid. 403.

This analysis considers

the strength of the evidence as to the
commission of the other crime, the
similarities between the crimes, the interval
of time that has elapsed between the crimes,
-20-

the need for the evidence, the efficacy of
alternative proof, and the degree to which
the evidence probably will arouse the jury to
overmastering hostility.
State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 295-96 (Utah 1988).
The probative value of understanding the relationship
between defendant and Jody Carpenter was significant to the
jury's understanding of defendant's intent, preparation, and plan
to conspire with Jared Mendoza to kill Timothy Lords. Without
such background, the jury would be subject to precisely the
"undue confusion'' that rule 403 seeks to avoid.

That is, knowing

that defendant took over Carpenter's drug business, that Mendoza
owed Carpenter — and then defendant — a substantial amount of
money for drugs used but not paid for, and that defendant had
retaliated against others who also owed drug money, all addressed
the crucial issue of why Mendoza and defendant would conspire to
kill Lords.

Because these facts were integral to the story of

the conspiracy and, indeed, all occurred within a short time
frame, the need for the evidence was especially great.
v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 295-96 (Utah 1988).

See State

Finally,

defendant has failed to demonstrate that evidence of his
involvement in the drug trade would have "roused the jury to
overmastering hostility" and caused them to incorrectly convict
him.

Indeed, the jury acquitted defendant of the most serious

charge in this case.

For all of these reasons, the danger of
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unfair prejudice did not substantially outweigh the probativeness
of the evidence to which defendant objects.
Defendant also objects for the first time on appeal to
testimony from a police officer that defendant admitted to using
meth both in Ogden and over the next few days before his arrest,
and to testimony from Jared Mendoza that defendant gave him an
intimidating, dirty look that Mendoza characterized as "[j]ust a
prison look.

Everybody that's been in prison has the same look."

See Br. of Aplt. at 23 (citing R. 185: 136; R. 186: 12). 8 In
order to prevail under the rubrics of both plain error and
ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must ultimately
establish prejudice or harm, to the extent that the reviewing
court's confidence in the verdict is undermined.

State v. Verde,

770 P.2d 116, 124 n.15 (Utah 1989).
Here, it can hardly be said that the statements undermined
confidence in the jury's verdict.
about a drug-related murder.

At its core, this case was

Indeed, defendant, Mendoza, and

Lords all found themselves in the same vehicle driving to Ogden
precisely because — in defendant's words — "There's no dope in
town.

You know, everybody wants dope" (R. 186: 45-46).

All

three men were deeply involved in the drug trade, as buyers,

8

Arguably, the prison remark could also go to the reason
Mendoza feared defendant and was willing to kill for him, as
another instance of defendant's intimidation. Because it is a
closer call, however, the state chooses to analyze the remark
under a prejudice analysis.
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sellers, and users.

The motivation for the murder, to retaliate

on an alleged snitch, was also drug-related.
123, 129.

See R. 185: 111,

It is unlikely to have come as any surprise to the

jury to learn either that defendant used drugs around the time
Lords was murdered or that he had at some point served time in
prison.9

These passing comments simply paled in comparison to

the chilling circumstances of the murder itself.

Having failed

to demonstrate anything more than a speculative possibility of a
more favorable outcome in the absence of these comments,
defendant's claims of plain error and ineffective assistance of
counsel fail.
harmless.

Any error in the admission of the evidence was

State v. Verde, 770 P.2d at 124 n.15.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's
conviction on one count of conspiracy to commit murder, a second
degree felony.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this lp'

day of September, 2005.

MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

JOANNE C. SLOTNIK
Assistant Attorney General

9

Moreover, for strategic reasons, defense counsel may have
chosen not to object, in order to avoid unduly emphasizing the
prison reference to the jury.
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